In the weeks leading up to the U.S. military strikes on Iran at the end of February, former President Donald Trump and his senior officials were presented with a bold proposal by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This meeting in the White House Situation Room, described by the New York Times, featured Netanyahu, high-ranking Israeli officials, and Mossad chief David Barnea, pitching a strategy to dismantle the Iranian regime. The attendees from the U.S. side included Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Dan Caine, White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, and special envoy Steve Witkoff. Netanyahu argued that a strike could effectively target Iran’s leadership, as they would be gathered in one location—a rare opportunity for a decisive blow, especially considering last summer’s successful assaults.

The Israeli plan aimed to dismantle Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, secure the Strait of Hormuz, and cripple Tehran’s ability to retaliate against the U.S. and its allies. They further suggested that Kurdish forces in Iraq might join the initiative and that Iranians could potentially rebel against their leaders if the threat was not addressed. However, when U.S. intelligence officials assessed the plan the following day, focusing on four objectives—assassinating Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, weakening Iran’s military power, inciting a popular revolt, and instigating regime change—their conclusion was cautious. While the first two objectives seemed feasible, the latter two were deemed unrealistic. At a subsequent meeting on February 12, both Ratcliffe and Rubio criticized the plan, particularly the promises of regime change and a popular uprising, dismissing them as unrealistic, with Rubio bluntly calling it ‘nonsense.’

Reports from the Times suggest that U.S. officials believed the initial objectives could be achieved with their intelligence and military capabilities. However, they saw Netanyahu’s additional goals, such as a Kurdish ground invasion of Iran, as disconnected from reality. JD Vance, who was not present at the initial meeting but attended the next day, also doubted the likelihood of regime change. Turning to General Caine, Trump inquired about his perspective. Caine remarked, “Sir, this is typical for the Israelis—they often overstate their plans and rely on us heavily.” Faced with the analysis that the Israeli proposal was flawed, Trump indicated that regime change was a matter for others to handle, though he did not specify who should take up that challenge.

Though many of Trump’s advisers ‘distrusted’ Netanyahu, the President was keen on taking out the Ayatollah and limiting Iran’s ability to project power regionally and through its many proxies, like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, the report states. No one did more to talk Trump out of the planned strikes than Vance. But weeks later, just days before the President green-lit US strikes on Iran in conjunction with Israel, Trump’s advisers deferred to the commander-in-chief’s judgement. ‘If we just mean killing the supreme leader, we can probably do that,’ Ratcliffe reportedly told the President. Rubio noted he didn’t think that regime change or a popular uprising were in the cards. But that didn’t prompt Trump to change course. ‘I think we need to do it,’ the 79-year-old told the room. The following day, Trump approved the strikes on Iran. ‘Operation Epic Fury is approved. No aborts. Good luck,’ the President told Caine.