By the fall of 2022 it’s evident there’s no short-term scenario in which Putin can achieve even paired-down objectives for his disastrous invasion of Ukraine. But Putin hopes that Russia’s over-stretched forces can hold their positions over winter, buying time to train and equip fresh forces for renewed offensives in Spring 2023.

To sustain the Kremlin’s planned long war, this Wednesday Putin declared a partial mobilization that will further disrupt daily life in many parts of Russia and Ukraine. You can read the decree here. At the same time, his cronies must prepare the Russian public for even more military defeats.

“Partial” Mobilization

While Russia’s drafting of 300,000 unwilling conscripts is nearly complete, it’s now imposing martial law on the four Ukrainian oblasts it illegally claims to be Russian soil (Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia).

Furthermore, a ‘medium-level’ degree of mobilization/martial law has been imposed on the adjacent Russian territories of Belgorod, Bryansk, Krasnodar, Kursk, Rostov and Voronezh, as well as Crimea (legally Ukrainian soil, but occupied by Russia since 2014.)

This empowers the regional military districts to redirect businesses, public security forces, and civil resources to support the war effort. Civilian governors must setup operational headquarters integrating local authorities with military and police officials to coordinate wartime measures.

Martial law also allows Russia to control the movement of civilians, say to prevent them from avoiding forced conscription or participating in protests; or (in Ukraine) to forcibly deport civilians from communities that may fall back under Ukrainian control or prevent them from fleeing to Ukrainian-controlled territory. The restrictions will be justified as necessary to combat the activities of Ukrainian agents, for which Russia has filmed arrests in staged propaganda films.

Dara Massicot, an expert at the RAND think tank on Russia’s military, and particularly its mobilization system, notes the significance of the orders in a thread on social media:

“I was waiting for this announcement. [Russia’s] system can’t mobilize this many people without mobilizing state resources too. I suspect that more special economic measures will be the next thing announced. The state needs more resources directed to the military.”

She also writes that the mobilization is only ‘partial’ in these sense that it so far only affects specific regions, not all of Russia generally.

Putin’s choice: accept defeat or risk disaster in Kherson

Meanwhile, in Ukraine’s southern Kherson province, both Kherson city’s Russia-installed mayor Volodymyr Saldo and regional official Kirill Stremousov are advising local civilians to flee across the Dnieper River as Ukrainian forces advance. As an excuse, they cite a supposed diabolical Ukrainian plan to flood the entire province.

Furthermore, General Sergei Surovikin—the newly-appointed leader of Russia’s war in Ukraine—gave a speech hinting at serious difficulties for Russian forces there: “The situation regarding the special operation is tense. The enemy does not abandon attempts to attack the positions of Russian troops.”

Amongst the axes under attack, he mentions the “Mykolaiv-Kryvyi Rih direction,” a reference to Russian positions in Kherson province.

Massicot views the statement as “preparing Russians for news of a retreat from Kherson city and the west bank. And potential bad news. The position is increasingly untenable for Russian forces there.”

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Since late August, Ukrainian forces have been steadily pressing Russian troops in Kherson province, who hold a bridgehead on the westside the Dnieper River centered around the city of the same name. Anticipating the attack, Russia had heavily fortified Kherson and rushed many reinforcements to both sides of the river.

But Ukraine has used precision-guided HIMARS and M270 rocket launcher systems supplied by the U.S. and its allies to destroy or heavily damage the few bridges across the Dnieper at Kherson and Nova Kakhovka, reducing the flow of supplies and reinforcements to a trickle coming across by ferry or newly constructed bridges that are rapidly destroyed by further HIMRS strikes.

That leaves the extensive Russian forces concentrated there decaying like fruit cut from the vine. In early October, a small-scale surprise Ukrainian offensive compelled Russian troops to retreat twenty miles back from positions in northeastern Kherson.

While there have been few dramatic moves since, Ukrainian and Russian reports alike suggest that supplies and morale of Russian forces in Kherson may be degrading to a critical condition.

If Russia’s military judges Kherson too indefensible and its position bound to collapse (as Russian commanders already reportedly thought back in September!) than the longer Putin avoids authorizing withdrawing, the more that retrograde movement risks going from a defeat to outright catastrophe.

Already, it seems doubtful Russia can recover most of the hundreds of heavy armored vehicles and artillery systems defending the west bank due to the damage/destruction of the bridges. But even simply extricating the thousands of personnel across the river while under Ukrainian pressure will be immensely difficult—especially if attempted while Ukrainian forces are rolling forward on the attack.

If a withdrawal isn’t deftly managed, Russia risks losing thousands of personnel killed or captured, which could result in battalions or even brigades evaporating as they are overrun trying to flee cross the Dnieper.

Therefore, preparing a Kherson withdrawal is likely Russia’s best move to avert an even messier and more unpleasant outcome.

But even if Russia’s military expertly conducts an evacuation, conceding Kherson would still amount to a huge defeat. By forsaking its bridgehead on the west bank of the Dnieper, it would end for the foreseeable future Putin’s hopes to capture the port of Odessa and effectively cripple Ukraine’s economy by cutting off its ability to export grain and ore via the Black Sea.

Furthermore, retreat would result in the abandonment territory Putin just a monthly earlier officially declared to be Russian soil—emphasizing the powerlessness of Putin’s illegal and broadly unrecognized claims. It also leaves in its wake an unforced commitment by Moscow to recapture its so-called internal territory that’s presently beyond its military means.

Putin must prepare a populace fed a steady diet of syrupy patriotic propaganda and nationalist TV bloviation about the ‘special operation’ for the bitter medicine ahead as Putin attempts to transform Russian society to sustain a lengthy war in Ukraine.

Massicot warns in her thread that the measures taken by Putin Wednesday, an in and the preceding month, are likely only the beginning:

“I think the Kremlin is spacing out the announcements to not put too many overwhelming pieces of information out at one time. They could think this approach, or gradual introductions, will keep things stable at home. Or Stable-ish.”

She concludes: “I don’t think [the 300,000 conscripts] will be the last call either. Maybe for a while until the first wave is spent or tired. Am I worried about where this is all going? Yes.”