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For 20 years, Israel has prepared for an attack on Iran, driven by a determination to prevent the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. Israeli leaders have long signaled their willingness to use military action to cripple Iran’s nuclear advancements.

In the aftermath of the attack, two questions arise. Why now? And what happens next?

There are six important factors that led to Israel’s decision to attack.

The assault by Hamas on October 7, 2023, has intensified sentiments among Israel’s leadership, reinforcing their belief that they are engaged in a critical fight for survival. The possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon is perceived as an existential threat, especially in the aftermath of the unsettling events of October 7, heightening their resolve to eliminate any potential risks.

Additionally, Israel finds Iran in a compromised defensive state, the weakest it has been in recent memory. Following Israeli air strikes in response to an Iranian missile attack targeted at Israel last October, Iran’s air defense systems and missile production capabilities were significantly impaired. Israel saw this as a rare chance to initiate actions against Iran while its defenses remained weakened.

The third reason is that Iran was getting closer to a “breakout capability” — which would have allowed it to assemble a nuclear weapon fairly rapidly. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced earlier this week that Iran had violated its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The fourth factor is that Israel is feeling much more confident about its ability to radically reshape the Middle East — and to become the regional superpower. The Israelis were warned by the Biden administration that if they attacked Hizbollah in Lebanon they would unleash potentially devastating retaliation. Benjamin Netanyahu’s government ignored those warnings, decapitated the Hizbollah leadership and contained the subsequent backlash. Israel has now moved on to a direct assault on Iran, its major regional adversary.

The fifth reason is that Israel is coming under increasing international pressure over the war and near-famine in Gaza. Attacking Iran enables the Netanyahu government to change the subject — and potentially forces European countries, which have been increasingly critical of Israel, to rally to Israel’s defence.

The sixth and final factor was Israel’s loss of confidence in the Trump administration’s nuclear talks with Iran. The Israelis believed these talks were not just misconceived but also potentially dangerous because they could leave Iran with a nuclear programme. With crucial talks between Iran and the US scheduled for this weekend, Israel decided to short circuit the process.

The Trump administration was well aware that this might happen. In recent days, senior US officials have told European visitors that they believed they had a good chance of securing a deal with Iran. But they added that Israel would not be satisfied with the deal — and believed the Netanyahu government would go ahead with an attack on Iran. 

A week ago the US moved some anti-missile defences from Europe to Israel, as well as evacuating some military dependants from the region — indicating they had a good idea of what was about to happen.

By attacking now, Israel has also cut short an impassioned and divisive debate within the Trump administration about whether to help Israel with a strike against Iran, or even whether to participate directly.

When Trump sacked Mike Waltz from his job as national security adviser at the beginning of May, it was widely believed that the pro-war, pro-Israel faction within the administration had been weakened — and that the so-called restrainers, who are much more sceptical of further American wars in the Middle East, had gained the upper hand.

But Israel’s attack has confounded the restrainers in the Trump administration. The Netanyahu government knows — from the recent Lebanon precedent — that Israel can probably ignore American pleas for restraint and that the US and its allies will still defend Israel from any Iranian retaliation. The alternative might be to see Tel Aviv hit by ballistic missiles and drones — and no US government is likely to accept that.

Nonetheless, Israel risks paying a long-term price in the US if it is seen as dragging the US unwillingly into yet another Middle Eastern war. The Trump administration, which is struggling to contain inflation, will also be dismayed by any rise in the global oil price.

European governments are braced for trouble. They worry about attacks on shipping in the Gulf, rising energy prices, new flows of refugees and the stability of key countries in the region, such as Egypt.

What comes next will depend on the scale and effectiveness of Iranian retaliation, which will become much more apparent in the coming days. If Iran is struggling to strike Israel directly, it might be tempted to go after American bases in the region — including in Qatar and Bahrain. But any such move could be counter-productive since it would ensure full-scale US participation in the war. 

Other risky Iranian options — long discussed by regional strategists — might include blocking or disrupting oil exports from the region. Saudi Arabia has long worried about strikes on the desalination plants that are crucial to the kingdom’s water supply.

Any such acts would invite further strikes on Iran by countries other than Israel. But the Iranian regime, like Israel, may now feel that it is in a fight for its own survival. It also needs to demonstrate its strength to the Iranian people and to the wider region.

A cycle of escalation may just be beginning.

gideon.rachman@ft.com