The U.S. Department of Justice requested on Monday that a federal judge in Florida dismiss a $100 million lawsuit initiated by several Proud Boys members. This lawsuit concerns their federal prosecutions and convictions following the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol.

The suit was filed by five individuals, including Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio, who received clemency from President Donald Trump. They claim that the DOJ and FBI violated their constitutional rights through what they describe as a “political prosecution” for their alleged involvement in planning January 6 events.

In the dismissal bid, the government points to the particulars.

It was revealed that four out of these five plaintiffs actually received only sentence commutations and are currently appealing the final judgments of their criminal cases. The DOJ argues this means they still have “ongoing prosecutions.”

The government points out that in these appeals, the plaintiffs – who remain defendants without any immediate threat to their freedom from the original crimes – face identical facts and legal questions as those in their lawsuit.

The DOJ’s request to dismiss states that “All claims brought here challenge the underlying convictions,” warning of “substantial” risks of parallel cases and contradictory judgments.

The government says this is not allowed by binding precedent.

The DOJ goes on to cite a 1994 Supreme Court opinion “designed to prevent” someone from being involved in “dual litigation on probable cause and guilt in a criminal case directly and a civil case collaterally.”

But foreclosing parallel litigation on the same facts and issues only applies to the four non-Tarrio plaintiffs – because the onetime Proud Boys leader received a pardon from the 45th and 47th president.

Again, the niceties of clemency control, the government says.

“[A]ny claim brought by Rehl, Nordean, Biggs, and Pezzola must be dismissed because they cannot show termination as their criminal cases are ongoing,” the motion argues. “As for Tarrio, under D.C. law (unlike federal law), a termination of criminal proceedings must be indicative of innocence to be deemed ‘favorable.’ A general pardon does not fit the bill. Thus, Tarrio’s claim fails as well.”

To put a point on it, the government adds: “[F]ederal courts now agree that a pardon does not blot out guilt or expunge a judgment of conviction.”

The DOJ also disputes some of the merits of the Florida-based litigation directly. And, again, binding precedent looms large.

The Proud Boys lawsuit, at a very foundational level, relies on a very specific statute that allows plaintiffs to recover for injuries or damages caused by the wrongs or negligent actions of federal employees. But this statute, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), is extremely limited and exacting in its application.

The FTCA requires a violation of the “law of the place,” which in the present instance means Washington, D.C. And, in the federal district, asserting a malicious prosecution is a well-worn concept.

To hear the government tell it, the plaintiffs would need to show a prosecutor moved forward with the charges only because “law enforcement applied undue pressure or presented knowingly false or fabricated evidence.” And that, the DOJ says, simply did not happen.

“Here, a grand jury ultimately indicted Plaintiffs,” the motion to dismiss reads. “Prosecutors were obviously involved in presenting the case to the grand jury. The Complaint fails to allege that law enforcement applied undue pressure on the prosecutors. Nor does it specify what false or fabricated evidence was presented to the prosecutors. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to overcome this break in causation and the malicious prosecution claim fails under the first element of the tort.”

The DOJ then doubles down on the evidentiary issue when defending the prosecution on the matter of probable cause. On this issue, of course, the Proud Boys are adamant: the government lacked it.

“Here, the bare allegation that no probable cause existed is a legal conclusion not entitled to an assumption of truth,” the motion goes on. “Otherwise, Plaintiffs make no effort to explain what about probable cause was lacking other than their blanket denials of wrongdoing. That does not suffice. Also, D.C. recognizes the general rule that probable cause determinations by a grand jury or judicial officer create a presumption of probable cause that can only be overcome by allegations, with sufficient factual support, that the determination was obtained by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means such as misrepresenting or withholding material facts. The Complaint here makes no attempt to explain what evidence supporting the grand jury indictment was knowingly false or fabricated or what material facts were misrepresented or withheld.”

In a secondary and tertiary motion also filed on Monday, the DOJ also defended FBI Agent Nicole Miller against direct claims made against her in the lawsuit and moved to stay any discovery pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss, respectively.