In a significant development, the Israel Defense Forces announced on Friday morning that Ismail Ahmadi, the top intelligence officer of Iran’s notorious Basij paramilitary force, was killed in an Israeli strike. This operation also claimed the life of Gen. Gholam Reza Soleimani, the leader of the Basij, earlier in the week.

The IDF shared on X that Ahmadi was instrumental in orchestrating terrorist activities under the Basij’s banner. His responsibilities included maintaining public order and upholding regime values for the Revolutionary Guards. Furthermore, during the internal unrest in Iran, Ahmadi was pivotal in leading brutal suppression tactics against civilian protesters, involving severe violence, widespread arrests, and forceful crackdowns.

The operation that eliminated Soleimani and Ahmadi was reportedly facilitated by a tip from Iranian civilians. They informed about the Basij leaders taking refuge in a tent along with their lieutenants in a wooded area of Tehran. This occurred after previous US and Israeli attacks had demolished their headquarters and command posts over the past two weeks, according to a report by the Wall Street Journal.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War highlighted in an assessment released late Thursday that the manner in which these Iranian leaders were eliminated underscored the significant operational and psychological impact of Operation Epic Fury on Tehran’s security infrastructure.

The strike that took out Soleimani and Ghani followed a tip from Iranian civilians that the Basij leaders were holed up in a tent with their lieutenants in a wooded area of Tehran after US and Israeli attacks had had destroyed their headquarters and command posts over the previous two weeks, the Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War noted in an assessment published late Thursday that the circumstances of the Iranian thugs’ demise showed the operational and psychological impact of Operation Epic Fury on Tehran’s security apparatus.

“Running a headquarters out of a tent rather than an established facility is certainly suboptimal, though not necessarily wholly ineffective,” the ISW wrote, also citing reports that some security forces had taken to hiding under bridges in a desperate attempt to avoid becoming targets.

“These reports indicate a notable level of operational shock across the regime’s coercive apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC), and suggest that elements of Iran’s internal security system are functioning suboptimally at this time.”