A federal judge in Baltimore firmly dismissed mutual attempts by the prosecution and a January 6 defendant to extend President Donald Trump’s extensive pardon to an unrelated firearm offense.

Through a detailed 19-page memorandum and order, U.S. District Judge James Kelleher Bredar, appointed by Barack Obama, deemed several fundamental arguments completely unpersuasive. Additionally, the judge identified one of the more intricate arguments as insufficiently developed and instructed the parties to submit further motions, giving them a final opportunity.

The court was, however, withering in its estimation of the government’s efforts to have the case dismissed so far.

“[A]s the record currently stands, the Court is unable to conclude that the Government is not acting in bad faith, and the parties will be directed to provide additional briefing,” Bredar intoned.

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The timeline of what, exactly, occurred before either party sought to apply the 45th and 47th president’s pardon to the gun crime case is instructive to the judge in the strongly worded order.

In February 2021, the defendant, Elias Costianes, was brought up on firearms charges following the execution of warrants by federal agents investigating the Jan. 6 riots at the U.S. Capitol Complex. At roughly the same time, federal prosecutors also brought a formally separate case, directly based on allegations that Costianes joined the pro-Trump mob at the Capitol and filmed himself inside the building.

In September 2023, Costianes pleaded guilty to one count of possession of firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user of any controlled substance. He was subsequently sentenced to serve 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release.

In February, on the same day he reported to prison, Costianes filed motions with the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals to have his sentence enjoined, stayed and overturned — based on Trump’s blanket pardon issued to all Jan. 6 defendants on Jan. 20.

Procedurally, the case was quickly a mess: the defendant’s pre-pardon appeal was effectively abandoned; then the 4th Circuit asked the defendant and the government to answer specific questions; instead the parties filed a joint motion to vacate the sentence; that motion was followed by an appellate court order and additional briefing; and then came a remand back down to the district court.

At the same time, lawyers were busy at the district court level. A motion to vacate was tersely denied by Bredar in early March. Then, a motion for release from custody and to stay the sentence pending appeal was volubly nixed by the lower court in late March.

In early April, the case was back before Bredar, with instructions from the 4th Circuit to decide the pardon issue. In response to a series of rulings, the judge told both parties to clarify, fully support, and resubmit their arguments, warning them not to be conclusory.

Now, having more or less tried to do so, the judge says the positions taken by the Trump administration and Costianes are unavailing.

The court identifies the operative language in the pardon as the instruction for the U.S. attorney general “to pursue dismissal with prejudice to the government of all pending indictments against individuals for their conduct related to the events at or near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.”

For Bredar, the inquiry is simple.

“The language in the Pardon is plain, and the terms are clear and unambiguous,” the opinion reads. “As another court easily concluded, ‘for an offense to fall within the Pardon’s scope, it must be tethered to a specific time — January 6, 2021 — and place at or near the U.S. Capitol.’ In short, the Court concludes that the Pardon means what it says.”

The judge goes on to say he is relying on a “simple canon of construction” — legalese for a framework used to interpret a document. This canon is identified as the notion that an “unambiguous” statute should result in a quick end to judicial inquiry.

Here’s how the court applied the pardon to the facts:

Accordingly, if an individual was convicted of an offense related to events that occurred (1) at or near the United States Capitol and (2) on January 6, 2021, the Pardon applies. Otherwise, it does not.

And in this case — where Costianes pleaded guilty to possessing firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user of any controlled substance in violation 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) on February 12, 2021 at his home in Maryland-the Pardon does not apply. The offense occurred on February 12, 2021, not on January 6, 2021, in the District of Maryland, not at or near the United States Capitol. The offense itself in no way related to the events of January 6, 2021 at the Capitol.

In their briefings, the government and the Jan. 6 defendant tried to convince the court that the pardon needed to be judicially massaged and to apply a liberal reading of the phrase “related to.”

The judge did not oblige.

“The parties, resisting the plain and unambiguous meaning of the Pardon, wish to draw the Court into an interpretive exercise,” Bredar goes on. “The Government and Costianes argue that the Court should conclude that the Pardon applies to his offense because it was discovered as a result of the execution of a warrant arising out of his conduct at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, and that the Pardon’s ‘related to’ language is broad enough to cover it.”

While the court admits Costianes’ gun crime “would likely not have been uncovered had he not been present” at the pro-Trump riot, Bredar says the “plain language” of the pardon “cannot be stretched so far as to cover Costianes’ offense” in Maryland.

“The Court recognizes that ‘related to’ can have a broad meaning,” Bredar muses. “But even such a broad term cannot be unlimited.”

Ultimately, the court believes the government and Costianes are trying to advance a severe misreading of Trump’s pardon.

“The context here makes abundantly clear that the Pardon does not extend so far as to cover offenses discovered as a result of investigations relating to January 6,” the opinion goes on. “The Pardon applies to offenses — not investigations — related to January 6.”

The parties also essayed an argument that, regardless of how the court might interpret the pardon, the government and Costianes have a “reasonable” reading that the grant of clemency engulfs the gun crime. The court sharply rubbished this line of thought.

Again, the opinion, at length:

[T]he Government’s interpretation is unreasonable, and the language of the Pardon does not bear the construction the parties urge…

[T]he Pardon’s text is plain and unambiguous, and the parties’ reading — that the Pardon applies to offenses discovered as a result of the execution of January 6-related warrants is unreasonable. The parties essentially ask that the Court read in additional words to the Pardon. This the Court may not do. The unreasonableness of the Government’s position is underscored by its inconsistent application of the Pardon. In short, the meaning proposed by the parties is patently in conflict with the plain terms of the Pardon. Thus, the Court concludes that the Pardon does not apply…

“There might be all manner of good faith reasons to seek the dismissal of this case,” Bredar continues later on. “But if reliance on the Pardon arguably was once one such reason, it is no longer, given the Court’s unequivocal rejection of the parties’ proposed interpretation. The President did not pardon Costianes for the instant offense. Any contention otherwise is now bad faith because it is not just incorrect, it is as the Court has concluded above — unreasonable.”

But there is one bright spot for Costianes.

The government used a so-called “Rule 48 Motion” to force the issue in the present case. Under this federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, which governs dismissal of cases, a court has very limited discretion whether or not to grant the government’s dismissal request. Underscoring the often complicated nature of law, the parties and the court treated the Rule 48 arguments as distinct from those about the text of the pardon and its relationship to the firearm offense.

In other words, arguing the pardon on the merits was one method for dismissal; using a Rule 48 procedural attack was another.

Here, the merits argument failed. And, while the court calls the Rule 48 arguments “spare” — and spends pages doubting their validity — Bredar concedes the parties did not yet have the ruling “on the applicability” of the pardon before briefing their procedural argument.

Now, the Trump administration and Costianes have until May 27 to file additional motions on Rule 48. Those final attempts will try to convince the judge that he is essentially powerless to deny dismissal.