The authors of the analysis at the Royal United Services Institute in London obtained around 800 pages of documents, including contracts and lists of equipment to be supplied by Moscow to Beijing, from the Black Moon hacktivist group.

The group, which previously published some of the documents online, does not identify its members but describes itself in a manifesto as opposed to governments that carry out aggressive foreign policy.

The authors of the RUSI report shared some of the documents with The Associated Press and say they appear to be genuine, although parts of the documents may have been omitted or altered.

AP is unable to independently verify their authenticity.

The mix of completed and apparent draft Russian documents reference meetings between Chinese and Russian delegations — including visits to Moscow — and payment and delivery timelines for high-altitude parachute systems and amphibious assault vehicles.

They suggest that Russia has begun work on the products to be delivered but don’t contain direct evidence from the Chinese side that Beijing has paid any money or received any equipment.

While the authors argue the equipment could be used to invade Taiwan, under Xi Jinping China has embarked upon a broad modernisation program of its armed forces with the goal of transforming it into a “world-class” military by 2050.

Equipment could be used to attack Taiwan

High ranking US officials have suggested Chinese President Xi Jinping ordered his military to be prepared for a possible invasion of Taiwan as early as 2027.

Beijing claims the self-governing democracy is rightfully a part of China and has not ruled out seizing the island by force.

The documents don’t mention Taiwan directly, but the RUSI analysis suggests the deal would help China gain advanced parachuting capabilities that it would need to mount an invasion, potentially speeding up a timeline.

It’s not certain that China has decided to invade Taiwan, but access to Russian equipment and localised training in China means Beijing will be better equipped for a potential invasion, Danylyuk said.

“The Chinese school of airborne landing is very young,” he said, suggesting Moscow’s assistance could help speed up China’s airborne program by about 10 to 15 years.

Russia’s Kremlin, and China and Taiwan’s defence and foreign ministries did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

“The greatest value of the deal” to China is likely in the training and procedures for command and control of parachute forces, because Russia has “combat experience,” whereas China doesn’t, write Oleksandr Danylyuk and Jack Watling.

The analysts say Russia’s aim is to develop as a military supplier to China and fund its war in Ukraine.

But Danylyuk also suggested to AP that Moscow may want to draw Beijing into a conflict with Washington over Taiwan, distracting the US from Russia’s war with Ukraine.

While Beijing’s military capabilities largely surpass Moscow’s, the analysis says China has gaps which Russia can fill.

Russia has a long history of airborne forces dating back decades, knowhow the authors say China needs.

Song Zhongping, a military commentator in Beijing, said China had superior equipment, but “Russia has more combat experience.”

“Russia and China have their own relative strengths in paratrooping,” Song said. They “conducted joint air, sea patrols and drills, which indicates they are learning from each other’s strengths to address their own weaknesses.”

Russia agreed to provide training and equipment

According to a document dated September 2024, an initial agreement was reached in April 2021 with timelines for payments and delivery.

Stages one and two — analysis of technical specifications, software modifications and equipment manufacturing — have been completed, according to that document.

Russia also agreed to provide training in China and a complete set of equipment for an airborne battalion including the ability to carry out infiltration by special forces, the analysis says.

That includes the sale of 37 light amphibious assault vehicles, 11 amphibious anti-tank self-propelled guns, and 11 airborne armored personnel carriers, as well as command and observation vehicles.

The total cost is listed as more than $US210 million ($320 million).

Beijing wants all the vehicles to be equipped with Chinese communication systems and to be prepared to use Chinese ammunition, the documents show.

Beijing seeks high-altitude parachute systems

Russia agreed to sell China systems which are designed for parachuting up to 190 kilograms from an extremely high altitude, the RUSI analysis said.

The documents reference the minutes of a meeting from March 8, 2024 in Moscow where Russia agreed to provide China by the end of 2024 with details of how the system, known as Dalnolyot, performed under colder temperature conditions: from –40 degrees Celsius to –60 degrees Celsius.

According to the documents, Beijing requested testing the parachute systems for drops from 8000 metres.

That height would allow Chinese forces to glide for up to 80 kilometers allowing “Chinese special forces groups to penetrate the territory of other countries without being noticed,” the RUSI report said.

Danylyuk suggested the Dalnolyot system could be used for a “stage zero” landing in Taiwan, in which Beijing secretly sends in equipment and special forces from aircraft outside Taiwanese airspace.

Russia’s parachute troops failed in Ukraine

Although Russia has a long history of parachute troops, Moscow did not deploy them successfully in Ukraine.

In February 2022, just days after Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, his special forces soldiers tried to take over Hostomel airfield on the outskirts of Kyiv.

They planned to establish a base to fly in more troops, but several Russian helicopters were hit by missiles before they even got to Hostomel.

An attempt to take control of a military airbase south of Kyiv also failed.

Western officials and military experts suggest the failure to establish an air bridge from Russia to Ukraine turned what Moscow expected to be a swift victory into a gruelling war three years and counting.

Now Moscow has dipped into its Soviet-era stocks to replace weapons on the battlefield and, like Ukraine, is ramping up its weapons production.

But that doesn’t mean Moscow is unable to sell equipment to China, Danylyuk said.

The airborne equipment described in the documents was necessary only for “the invasion stage,” he said. Russia is fighting a “completely different war right now,” and doesn’t need such equipment for Ukraine, he said.

Lessons from Russian defeats

In an invasion of Taiwan, China’s “operational challenge” would be to do what Russia did not: suppress Taiwan’s air defences and land sufficient troops and equipment to be able to build up a force to defeat the Taiwanese military before it mobilises, the analysts wrote.

The report suggests China could do that by airdropping armoured vehicles on golf courses near Taiwanese ports and airfields which could allow air troops to clear a path for landing forces.