For seven seasons, the Atlanta Hawks were molded around one specific team style, heavily influenced by Trae Young’s unique playing characteristics. Young, known more for his offensive prowess than his defensive skills or off-ball movement, necessitated an offensive strategy centered on him, often involving a high volume of pick-and-roll plays. This approach, though straightforward, proved effective. Between 2021 and 2024, the Hawks consistently maintained at least league-average half-court efficiency and performed significantly better offensively when Young was on the court.

However, this strategy had its limitations. During this period, the Hawks ranked 22nd, 25th, 29th, and 30th in the league for passes per game, and they failed to post an above-average defensive season with Young. The team’s style was constrained by these factors. Yet, when an early-season injury sidelined Young, it inadvertently opened new avenues. The Hawks improved their ball movement, jumping to ninth in passes and enhancing their defense to rank 10th. They reoriented their offensive strategy around transition play, with only the Clippers outperforming them in this area. Teams like the Pistons, Heat, and Raptors dedicated a higher portion of their possessions to transition, but Atlanta committed wholly to this new identity, culminating in a trade that sent Young to Washington.

Despite these changes, the postseason did not go as planned. In their first-round playoff series against the New York Knicks, the Hawks struggled offensively, ranking only above the Pistons, Magic, and Trail Blazers. Their Game 6 elimination was particularly disheartening, finding themselves down by 47 points at halftime and managing just 36 points in the first half. Their fast-break points dropped from around 18 per game in the regular season to just 13 in the playoffs. Additionally, their ball movement regressed, with their passes per game decreasing from approximately 295 during the regular season to 257 in the postseason, ranking them only above the Thunder and 76ers.

What went wrong vs. the Knicks?

So, what went wrong? Several factors played a role. The Knicks aren’t a team that easily succumbs to fast-paced gameplay. They are disciplined with the ball, rarely turning it over, and their strong offensive rebounders can pursue the glass without sacrificing their transition defense. This made them one of the league’s best at limiting transition opportunities. The Knicks were well-suited to the slower, tactical style of playoff basketball, a realm where the Hawks are still finding their footing.

Throughout the series, the Hawks found themselves frequently outnumbered offensively. New York largely ignored Dyson Daniels on the perimeter, forcing Atlanta to adapt. Daniels, operating somewhat like a center, was the primary pick-and-roll screener, while Onyeka Okongwu, Atlanta’s actual center, took on perimeter shooting duties. However, Daniels’ shooting lacked the threat necessary to disrupt the Knicks’ defensive setup, making it challenging for the Hawks to effectively execute their game plan.

Atlanta spent a lot of this series playing 4-on-5 offensively. New York simply did not guard Dyson Daniels from the perimeter. Atlanta built its offense to account for that. Daniels functions, to an extent, as a center, serving as the primary pick-and-roll screener for the Hawks, while their actual center, Onyeka Okongwu, fires more 3s than most players his size. He just isn’t enough of a shooting threat to compel the Knicks into compromising their rim defense. 

The expectation coming into this series was that New York’s best defender, OG Anunoby, would guard Hawks All-Star Jalen Johnson. He did a fair bit of that, but he also spent quite a lot of time on Okongwu so he could serve as a spare rim-protector. Johnson, in his first playoff series in the rotation, couldn’t generate advantages while guarded by the smaller Josh Hart, so the Hawks dropped from about 52 paint points per game in the regular season to about 45 in the playoffs. Atlanta’s beautiful ball movement and speed ground to a halt.

Atlanta’s offense only really worked in the simplest way: when CJ McCollum generated his own offense. The Hawks won Games 2 and 3 behind 55 McCollum points, mostly scored at the expense of Jalen Brunson, against whom he shot 73.7% in the first five games of the series. Sometimes, the playoffs are as simple as having a great, individual shot-maker who can hunt the worst opposing defender to generate points. New York’s great, individual shot-maker is a 29-year-old about to make his third All-NBA team. Atlanta’s is a 34-year-old who has never made an All-Star Game.

What do the Hawks need?

There are lessons for the Hawks to take from all of this. For their playoff offense to function, they probably need a guard capable of doing what McCollum did early in the series, but more consistently. Young was that kind of guard. Does that mean they should have kept him? No, because he locked them out of all of the other things that went right this season. The Hawks don’t need to abandon their ball movement or transition. They need to amplify it with a better scoring guard than they currently have.

They fortunately have ample resources with which to try to do that. Johnson, Okongwu and Nickeil Alexander-Walker are all locked into such team-friendly deals that the Hawks have straightforward pathways to cap space in the next few offseasons if they want to pursue it. For now, they’ll likely operate above the cap this offseason to keep McCollum and Jonathan Kuminga. The focus will probably be on the trade market and, depending on the lottery, the draft.

Atlanta infamously managed to relieve the Pelicans of their unprotected 2026 first-round pick in a trade at last year’s draft. That pick came with swap rights attached to the Bucks, meaning Atlanta has two bites at the lottery apple coming. If either New Orleans or Milwaukee moves up, the Hawks have a chance at one of the star prospects of this class. And if they don’t? The back half of the top 10 is full of high-level guard prospects. In a perfect world, the Hawks draft Darryn Peterson. If they can’t, Keaton Wagler or Darius Acuff would suffice.

Ideally, the Hawks find their guard in June and are off to the races from there. If they don’t, it’s worth remembering that the Hawks have another Pelicans/Bucks pick coming in 2027, though it’s an inferior one. The Hawks will get the lesser of those two picks, provided they don’t both land in the top four. Not the golden ticket the 2026 pick was, but a useful trade chip nonetheless if the Hawks decide to go shopping for a veteran guard.

There are more questions to be answered here. Daniels is a big one. He shot 34% on three 3-point attempts per game last season. Not great, but serviceable enough. He shot below 19% on less than half of the attempts this season. The Hawks don’t need Daniels to be a marksman. They need opponents to guard him. His screening, passing and transition offense are enormously additive to the Hawks offensively when things are going right, and that’s before factoring in his role as Atlanta’s best defender. They just don’t have the collective shooting at this stage to compensate for him. Maximizing Johnson’s rim pressure, especially in the half-court, relies on improving their spacing.

These problems are just more solvable than the ones posed by the Young version of the team. There’s only so far you can go when you’re locked into one specific style. The Hawks landed on something more malleable this season, and it mostly fit their other players quite well. They’ll have to supplement those players with more talent and perhaps tweak the ways in which they use them, but considering how bleak things looked in Atlanta only a couple of years ago, this is a fairly promising overall position the Hawks have created for themselves. They cap-dumped their franchise player and still went on to trade blows with a Finals contender for six games. They’re only going to get better with more time to build around this new philosophy.