KAOHSIUNG, Taiwan: On Christmas Eve last year, a curious maritime occurrence unfolded in the East China Sea. Satellite tracking and ship-transponder data showed an assembly of thousands of Chinese fishing vessels forming tight, linear formations and remaining stationary for prolonged durations. This event repeated itself two weeks later.
Geospatial analysts were among the first to notice these significant formations, involving approximately 1,400 and 2,000 fishing vessels. The presence of these stationary boats forced cargo ships in the vicinity to either reroute or navigate carefully around them. Analysts suggest that this behavior, exhibited by Chinese fishing fleets, represents a form of “gray zone” operation.
Holmes Liao, a defense expert and senior advisor for the Taiwan Space Agency (TASA), mentioned to Fox News Digital that some U.S. defense specialists propose treating China’s maritime militia as a legitimate naval force.
ingeniSPACE, a geospatial analysis firm, detected these large, coordinated gatherings of fishing vessels, as captured in this image, in late December 2025 and twice more this year. (ingeniSPACE)
Liao emphasized that Taiwan might need to adopt a similar perspective. “If these Chinese vessels are operating under explicit military orders, their classification under the law of armed conflict could be reconsidered, potentially impacting their civilian immunity status,” he stated.
He further suggested that Taiwan should deploy surveillance drones or conduct air patrols over these maritime militia formations to assert its presence and enhance deterrence. “Taiwan has exhibited a cautious approach to PRC provocations,” Liao noted. “While they appear to be fishing boats, they are effectively under the command of the People’s Liberation Army and form part of the maritime militia.”
Indeed, several editions of the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual “Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China,” describe the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) as a “state-organized, trained, and equipped” force that actively supports China’s navy and coast guard.
Chinese tourists watch a fishing boat sailing through the Taiwan Strait, on the coast of Pingtan island, the closest point in China to Taiwan, in southeast China’s Fujian province on April 16, 2023. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative have previously documented swarms of dozens or even hundreds of Chinese vessels in the South China Sea near contested reefs, often remaining stationary for long periods. But the incidents late last year and early this year highlight how the scale of this fishing militia appears to be expanding.
Fishing vessels are inexpensive, numerous and legally ambiguous. When deployed in mass, they complicate navigation, create radar clutter and raise operational risks for commercial shipping. The civilian status of these boats also conveniently allows Beijing to frame any incidents as “rogue actions not sanctioned by authorities,” or as accidents.
The United States frequently cites freedom of navigation as the reason for navy patrols in the Indo-Pacific, with a U.S. State Department fact sheet noting that the region “accounts for 60% of global GDP.” The area around Taiwan is already treated by maritime insurers and shipping firms as a “higher-risk environment,” meaning even temporary flotilla formations could influence shipping decisions and significantly affect both regional and global economies.
Taipei-based security analyst Sasha Chhabra, however, warned of the risks China would face should it deploy civilian fishing vessels in an active conflict. “A U.S. Navy convoy could easily break through these lines, and the large commercial vessels that carry Taiwan’s much-needed imports would easily splinter most fishing vessels in a ramming incident.”
He noted that there is precedent for Beijing using Chinese fisherman as “live bait” during a conflict. “In 1973, China used civilian fishing vessels to bait the South Vietnamese Navy into conflict and seize full control over the Paracels (islands),” said Chhabra. “But what worked against teetering South Vietnam in 1973 won’t work against the U.S. Navy.”
However, for independently ruled Taiwan, the concern could be cumulative pressure rather than a single dramatic incident. Encounters between Taiwanese patrol vessels and Chinese fishing boats have grown more frequent around outlying islands and in parts of the Taiwan Strait, with vessels sometimes operating in coordinated groups that shadow or crowd Taiwanese ships. The maritime militia could also be used as a tool to discourage the global shipping industry from doing business with Taiwan.
Fishing boats are seen in a harbour on Pingtan island, the closest point in China to Taiwan, in China’s southeast Fujian province on April 15, 2023. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
Taiwan’s major ports are the energy and industrial lifelines for this de facto independent state. The port of Kaohsiung in the south, for example, handles large volumes of LNG imports and petrochemical shipments. Even partial disruption or perceived instability in surrounding sea lanes could ripple through supply chains and sharply raise costs for the global economy.
Jason Wang, CEO of ingeniSPACE, the company that revealed the fishing fleets on their satellite systems, told Fox News Digital that despite Taiwan’s semiconductor advantage, China is winning in space. Wang said data fusion and satellite-based maritime awareness are now strategic necessities. “Intelligence is deterrence without provocation. Intelligence ensures efficient targeted spending and is a force multiplier by shaping a more effective military force,” he said. “Taiwan, like all First Island Chain nations, must be prepared for a new kind of warfare.”
Wang and other experts note that countries like Japan and South Korea have, for roughly a decade, aggressively augmented their satellite spy constellations with commercial satellites to “ensure sufficient coverage and revisit rates so that their leadership has the capability to distinguish both overt military and gray zone activity.”
Analysts say the broader lesson is that sea control no longer depends solely on destroyers and submarines. In the immediate future, the most consequential maritime pressure may come not from warships, but from vessels that look, at first glance, entirely harmless.
